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ABSTRACT 
Substantial evidence has highlighted reference effects occurring during decision-making, whereby 
subjective value is not calculated in absolute terms but relative to the distribution of rewards 
characterizing a context. Among these, within-choice effects are exerted by options simultaneously 
available during choice. These should be distinguished from between-choice effects, which depend 
on the distribution of options presented in the past. Influential theories on between-choice effects 
include Decision-by-Sampling, Expectation-as-Reference and Divisive Normalization. Surprisingly, 
previous literature has focused on each theory individually disregarding the others. Thus, similarities 
and differences among theories remain to be systematically examined. Here we fill this gap by 
offering an overview of the state-of-the-art of research about between-choice reference effects. Our 
comparison of alternative theories shows that, at present, none of them is able to account for the 
full range of empirical data. To address this, we propose a model inspired by previous perspectives 
and based on a logistic framework, hence called logistic model of subjective value. Predictions of the 
model are analysed in detail about reference effects and risky decision-making. We conclude that 
our proposal offers a compelling framework for interpreting the multifaceted manifestations of 
between-choice reference effects.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider an individual who, right before closing a deal for buying a flat, discovers that the price of 
the flat is £10 more than expected. Compare this with a case of a person who, before buying a 
coffee, is asked to pay £10 more than predicted. Apparently, an objectively equivalent extra-cost is 
experienced by both individuals. However, many would agree that the second person will be more 
upset. Examples like this describe well how our emotions, feelings, and behaviours are not just 
determined by the objective circumstances we are experiencing, but also by the frame we use to 
interpret these circumstances. Helson was one of the first scholars proposing that our judgements 
are rarely constructed in absolute terms, but they are usually built relative to a frame of reference 
(Helson, 1948; see also the work of New Look psychology for a similar perspective; e.g., Bruner & 
Goodman, 1947). For example, they arise from a comparison with the average stimulus encountered 
in the past. Similar ideas have flourished in research on perception, emotion, social relations, and 
affect (e.g., Cash et al., 1983; Clifford, 2002; Crosby, 1976; Diener et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 1978; 
Thompson, 1981; Webster, 2015). Different terminologies are sometimes used across domains, but 
the processes involved are analogous as all describe judgments that are formed based on the 
position of a stimulus relative to some other stimuli in a context. Hence, the general term reference 
effect appropriately characterizes the common nature of the different processes described in the 
literature.  
One domain where reference effects have a dramatic impact is when individuals are inferring the 
subjective value (sometimes referred to also as incentive value or utility) of stimuli, and have to rely 
on this to make choice. The consideration that reference effects play a critical role in decision-
making is already implicit in classical economic theories such as Expected Utility Theory (EUT; 
Camerer et al., 2011; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, an explicit and systematic 
treatment of reference effects was first proposed by a psychological account, namely Prospect 
Theory (PT; Camerer et al., 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), where the concept of reference point 
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(intended as the status quo) plays a prominent role. Building on this and analogous ideas, theoretical 
and empirical work has probed reference effects further, for example examining the role of 
expectations (Hunter & Gershman, 2018; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2017) memory 
retrieval (Brown & Matthews, 2011; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015), and efficient coding 
(Louie et al., 2013; 2014; 2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012). Moreover, analogous effects have been 
observed during multiattribute choice, generating conspicuous theoretical debate (Huber at al., 
1982; Noguchi & Stewart, 2018; Rigoli et al., 2017; Roe et al., 2001; Ronayne & Brown, 2017; 
Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Soltani et al., 2012; Trueblood et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2010; Tversky, 
1972). 
A useful taxonomy of reference effects in decision-making can be built by considering two 
dichotomies (Louie et al., 2015; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Rigoli et al., 2017). One views between-
choice effects (sometimes referred to as temporal effects (Louie et al., 2015) or background effects 
(Simonson & Tversky, 1992)), elicited by stimuli or options presented in previous trials, as opposed 
to within-choice effects (sometimes referred to as spatial effects (Louie et al., 2015)), which depend 
on stimuli and options currently available. The second dichotomy opposes multiattribute decision-
making, occurring when a trade-off between multiple attributes is required, versus non-
multiattribute contexts, where such trade-off is not at play. The combinations derived from the 
dichotomies generate four possible categories. The category that has attracted more attention 
comprises effects in within-choice and multiattribute contexts. On this, sophisticated theories exist 
that have been discussed in depth elsewhere (Noguchi & Stewart, 2018; Roe et al., 2001; Ronayne & 
Brown, 2017; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Soltani et al., 2012; Trueblood et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 
2010). The category comprising within-choice and non-multiattribute effects and the category 
comprising between-choice and multiattribute effects remain poorly investigated (Louie et al., 2013; 
Rustichini et al., 2017; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Vlaev et al., 2009). The last category comprises 
between-choice and non-multiattribute effects. Especially in recent years, these have received 
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substantial attention (e.g., Louie et al. 2014; Stewart et al., 2015; Rigoli et al., 2016c; 2016d), yet a 
systematization of the different theories and empirical evidence is lacking.  
The goal of the present paper is to discuss the state-of-the-art of research about reference effects in 
between-choice and non-multiattribute contexts (other forms of reference effects are not examined 
here), and to contribute to extend this research further. First, we describe between-choice reference 
effects and how they have been documented empirically. Also, we discuss how decision-making 
models interpret between-choice reference effects, with a specific focus on classical theories such as 
EUT and PT, and on recent proposals such as Expectation-as-Reference models (EaR) (Hunter & 
Gershman, 2018; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2017), Decision-by-Sampling theory 
(DbS) (Brown & Matthews, 2011; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 
2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011), and Divisive Normalization theory (DNT) (Louie et al., 2013; 
2014; 2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012). It is surprising that, so far, previous literature has largely 
considered each of these models in isolation, and that a systematic analysis of their similarities and 
differences is absent. To address this gap, we compare predictions of contemporary perspectives 
with respect to their fit with empirical data. This examination reveals that, so far, none of the 
available models fully fit with available evidence. To address this, we propose a model that 
integrates previous accounts and aims at providing a comprehensive explanation of all available 
empirical data. The theoretical and empirical implications of the model are discussed, and we 
conclude that it provides an improved description of available evidence.  
 
2. RESEARCH ON BETWEEN-CHOICEN REFERENCE EFFECTS 
2.1 Empirical observations 
Reference effects that depend on stimuli encountered in the past (i.e., between-choice effects) have 
been first documented in perceptive processes (e.g., Clifford, 2002; Jerger, 1957; Khon, 2007; 
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Schweinberger et al., 2008; Thompson, 1981; Webster, 2015; Watkinson et al., 2013). However, a 
large body of evidence supports their critical role also in emotional, affective, and social domains 
(e.g., Cash et al., 1983; Crosby, 1976; Diener et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 1978). For example, 
whether a facial stimulus is perceived as showing anger depends on whether preceding stimuli 
display angry faces or not (Webster et al., 2004). Specifically, the likelihood of perceiving anger 
increases if previous stimuli do not show angry faces. Analogous phenomena have been 
documented in social domains. For example, research has found that the self-reported well-being 
depends on a comparison between the current and the past level of wealth (Boyce et al., 2010; 
Brown et al., 2008; Diener et al., 1999; 2009; Rutledge et al., 2014) (or the wealth of other people in 
the reference group such as neighbours, colleagues, and individuals sharing the same ethnic origin 
(e.g., Crosby et al., 1976)).  
Given the ubiquity of reference effects in affective processes, it is not surprising that they have 
emerged also during value attribution and choice. For example, a field study (Simonsohn & 
Loewenstein, 2006) has reported that movers arriving from more expensive cities rent pricier 
apartments than those arriving from cheaper cities (presumably, here previous cities play the role of 
context). Research has attempted to shed light on the nature of this sort of effects. To this aim, 
recent laboratory experiments have systematically manipulated the features of the distribution of 
reward presented in previous trials (a contextual reward distribution), and have assessed the impact 
of this manipulation on value attribution and choice (Hunter & Gershman, 2018; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 
2016b; 2016c; 2018; Stewart et al., 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 2015). The simplest manipulation has 
targeted the average of the distribution. Evidence has shown that the same reward is attributed a 
higher incentive value when the contextual average is lower (e.g., Rigoli et al., 2016b; 2016c) (an 
influence sometimes referred to as contrast effect (Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 2006)). For example, 
a recent study (Rigoli et al, 2016c) has compared choice behaviour for a low-average context 
including £1, £3, and £5 as amounts against a high-average context including £3, £5, and £7 as 
amounts (fig 1a); note that £3 and £5 are common to both contexts. Data indicated that participants 
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attributed higher subjective value to common amounts during the low-value context. More recently, 
researchers have observed that, in addition to the average, the variability of the distribution also 
affects value attribution and choice (Rigoli et al., 2016a). A recent study (Rigoli et al., 2016a) has 
compared choice behaviour for a low-variability context including £3 and £4 as amounts against a 
high-variability context including £2, £3, £4, and £5 as amounts (fig 1b); note that £3 and £4 are 
common to both contexts. When comparing the low-variability versus high-variability context, data 
indicate that participants attributed higher subjective value to £4, but lower subjective value to £3. 
This finding suggests that, with lower variability, distances across rewards amounts are magnified in 
such a way that, subjectively, two different reward amounts will appear as farther apart from each 
other. 
In short, research has revealed at least two forms of reference effects on value attribution and 
choice, one dependent on the average and the other on the variability of the contextual reward 
distribution. A theory should be able to explain these two forms of effects. Below, we review 
classical and contemporary perspectives on reference effects in decision making and assess their 
ability to explain the two empirical effects introduced here. 
------------------------------------ 
FIG 1 around here 
------------------------------------- 
2.2 Theories 
EUT is the most influential economic theory of decision-making, based on the simple idea that 
subjective utility (which is the variable driving choice) is a concave function of wealth (Camerer et al., 
2011; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). An implication of this model is that, to produce the 
same utility experience, the increase of wealth required depends on the initial level of wealth. In 
other words, if the initial wealth is small, the same wealth increase will obtain a higher utility 
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compared to when the initial wealth is large. This property of the model can be viewed as an implicit 
attempt to conceptualize reference effects, being the notion of initial wealth close to the notion of 
contextual average reward as formulated by research on reference effects. However, EUT presents 
at least two shortcomings. First, while analogies may be proposed between initial wealth and 
contextual average reward, EUT does not provide any insight for explaining an influence of 
contextual variability. Second, reflecting the actual goods and assets owned by an individual, the 
concept of wealth refers to an objective quantity and not to subjective beliefs. On the contrary, 
empirical data have emphasized the psychological nature of reference effects (Simonsohn & 
Loewenstein, 2006). For example, in the experiment on movers mentioned above (showing that 
movers arriving from more expensive cities rent pricier apartments than those arriving from cheaper 
cities), the reference effect observed was not mediated by the individuals’ objective wealth 
(Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 2006). In other words, it was the psychological context, consisting in the 
representation of the apartments’ prices, that counted, and not whether an individual was 
objectively richer or poorer. 
An explicit emphasis on the psychological context characterizes PT, which is the most influential 
theory of decision-making proposed by psychologists (Camerer et al., 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). This framework is an eminent example of a model created primarily for explaining reference 
effects. Inspired by Helson’s adaptation level model (Helson, 1948), PT proposes that the subjective 
value of a stimulus is not based on its absolute properties, but it is constructed by comparing the 
stimulus against a reference point. This allows the model to distinguish between gains and losses, 
experienced when the stimulus is better and worse than the reference point, respectively. The idea 
of reference point is analogous to the notion of contextual average reward, providing an elegant 
interpretation of reference effects elicited when the contextual average reward varies. However, 
two important shortcomings can also be identified for PT. First, as for EUT, PT is not sufficient to 
account for reference effects dependent on contextual variability. A second shortcoming is the 
notion that the reference point corresponds to the status quo. In other words, the reference point in 
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PT is conceived as corresponding to the current condition as assessed by an individual. This 
assumption has been criticized by EaR models for reasons described below. 
EaR models rely on a perspective analogous to PT (Hunter & Gershman, 2018; Kőszegi & Rabin, 
2006; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2017). However, they do not interpret the frame of reference as the status 
quo, but as reflecting expectations about upcoming stimuli (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006). This distinction 
is important, as sometimes individuals might believe that the status quo will remain invariant, but 
other times they might expect the future to be different. According to EaR, it is the beliefs about the 
future, and not the beliefs about the status quo, that play the role of frame of reference to which 
rewards are compared once they are experienced. In line with PT, a first version of EaR models 
conceives the frame of reference as a single point (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006). According to this model, 
the subjective value of a stimulus corresponds to a reward prediction error (RPE), namely to the 
difference between the reward obtained and the reference point or expected reward. This enables 
the model to explain reference effects due to manipulations of the contextual average reward. 
However, this EaR model is unable to explain reference effects emergent when the contextual 
variability is manipulated. To address this shortcoming, a more recent EaR model has adopted a 
Bayesian account in which the reference frame corresponds to a Gaussian distribution, and 
therefore it is defined by the two parameters of average and variance (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2017). In 
this way, the subjective value of a stimulus does not correspond simply to the difference between 
the reward and the reference point (as in PT and in previous EaR accounts), but it corresponds to 
this difference weighted by the variance, or to a weighted RPE. In its simplest form (assuming that 
the prior variance is equal to one; see Rigoli 2016a; 2017), the subjective value 𝑉𝑅 associated with a 
reward amount R is computed similarly to a z-score and corresponds to: 
 
𝑉𝑅 =
𝑅 − µ
𝜎2
 
 
(1) 
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Where the parameter µ corresponds to the expected reward (usually equal to the average of the 
contextual reward distribution), and the parameter 𝜎2 corresponds to the uncertainty (usually 
calculated as the variance of the distribution). In line with empirical evidence, in the model a smaller 
variance corresponds to a larger weight of the RPE, implying that perceived differences among 
reward amounts will be magnified. This aspect allows the model to explain, in addition to effects 
dependent on the contextual average, also effects elicited by the contextual variability. 
While EaR models adopt a perspective analogous to PT, a radically alternative approach 
characterizes DbS (Brown & Matthews, 2011; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015; Walasek & 
Stewart, 2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011). This theory can be described at two different levels. 
At a more abstract level, DbS proposes that relative ranking is the principle driving computation of 
subjective value. In other words, the subjective value 𝑉𝑅 of a stimulus R depends on its ranking 
within a contextual stimulus set (calculated by counting how many stimuli are considered as worse 
than the target stimulus) and on the number of stimuli in the set n:  
 
𝑉𝑅 =
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑅) − 1
𝑛 − 1
 
 
(2) 
For example, in a set of eleven objects, a stimulus better than three alternatives (hence having 
ranking equal to four) will be associated with 𝑉𝑅 = 0.3. This elegant idea is sufficient to explain both 
reference effects dependent on the contextual average and those dependent on the contextual 
variability. The higher level of analysis proposed by DbS is consistent with a lower level where the 
theory describes the fine-grained cognitive processes engaged. Specifically, when a set of options is 
offered, each option elicits retrieval from memory (in the form of random sampling) of stimuli 
encountered in the past, especially those associated with the current context. A set of binary 
comparisons follows between the option and the samples, and the number of comparisons in which 
the option is favoured over each sample is recorded. This number corresponds to the subjective 
value of the option and is computed for all options available, hence determining their relative 
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preference. Since samples are drawn from memory, they depend on past experience and therefore 
reflect the distribution of options and outcomes characterizing the environment or context, 
providing the conditions for reference effects to emerge.    
To understand DbS, it is helpful to consider a more general framework called Range-Frequency 
Theory (RFT) (Parducci, 1965; 1995). RFT is a highly influential model applied to a variety of domains, 
from perception to affect, regarding how we build our judgements about magnitudes. The 
underlying idea is that judgements derive from integrating a ranking influence similar to DbS (see 
equation 2) combined with an influence of the range of the contextual distribution. Applied to the 
calculation of subjective value, RFT can be formulated as (Brown & Matthews, 2011): 
 
𝑉𝑅 = 𝑤 (
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑅) − 1
𝑛 − 1
) + (1 − 𝑤) (
𝑅 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛
) 
 
(3) 
Where max reflects the largest reward amount within a set of n amounts characterizing a given 
context, min reflects the smallest amount, and where w (bounded between zero and one) 
represents the relative weight of the ranking component over the range-related component. The 
weight w is multiplied by the relative ranking of R (see equation 2), and the weight 1-w is multiplied 
by the range-related component.  
A third contemporary perspective on reference effects is offered by DNT (Louie et al., 2013; 2014; 
2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012). Divisive normalisation was initially proposed in the sensory domain 
to explain phenomena such as neural adaptation within the retina to stimuli of varying intensity 
(Carandini & Heeger, 2012). This framework has been generalized to describe higher-order cognitive 
processes such as selective attention and perceptual decision-making (Carandini & Heeger, 2012; 
Cheadle et al., 2014). Its overarching principle is the notion of efficient coding, in other words the 
maximization of mutual information between the neural signalling and the statistics of the 
environment. Assuming noise in neural responding, it is postulated that an optimal signal-to-noise 
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ratio is achieved if the sensitivity of neurons is tuned to the distribution of stimuli within a context. 
The specific way DNT realizes efficient coding is by adjusting the neuronal gain based on the average 
of the contextual distribution. Recently, this framework has been extended to interpret reference 
effects in value-based decision-making (Louie et al., 2013; 2014; 2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012). 
With regard to between-choice reference effects (Louie et al., 2014; 2015), it has been proposed 
that the subjective value 𝑉𝑡 of a reward amount 𝑅𝑡 presented at trial t is obtained by: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑀𝐴𝑋
𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽
𝜔 + (𝛴𝑗=1
𝑡−1𝛾𝑗𝑅𝑗)/(𝑡 − 1)
 
 
(4) 
Where 𝑉𝑀𝐴𝑋, β and ω are constant. The critical aspect of this proposal is that the denominator 
includes the mean of the rewards encountered in the past, calculated by weighting each reward by 
its temporal delay according to an exponential discounting governed by the parameter 0 < γ < 1. This 
enables the model to explain reference effects elicited by manipulations of the contextual average 
reward. Note that equation 3 does not implement any influence of the variance of the distribution, 
and thus it does not explain reference effects exerted by the contextual variance. However, DNT 
offers a promising framework, given its interest in the notion of efficient coding and its explicit 
connections with neurophysiological processes. 
In short, we have identified three main contemporary models that aim at explaining reference 
effects occurring in between-choice and non-multiattribute contexts. Below we consider the models’ 
predictions in more detail, and assess their fit with empirical data.   
 
2.3 Effects of skewness 
For research on reference effects occurring in between-choice and non-multiattribute contexts, an 
important step is now to compare contemporary theories in terms of their specific predictions and 
fit with empirical data. Here, we consider such comparison. To this aim, we consider all between-
13 
 
choice non-multiattribute effects reported by empirical research we are aware of, and we ask 
whether each of these effects is compatible with predictions arising from the different models. This 
approach is common in the literature investigating between-choice non-multiattribute effects (e.g., 
Stewart et al., 2015). Note this is different from an approach where model free parameters are fitted 
to data and models are compared based on model-fitting indexes. The latter approach is not 
applicable here, because some of the models (such as DbS; see equation 2) have no free parameters 
(see also Palminteri et al., 2017).  
Above, our focus has been on the influences of the contextual average and variability. We have seen 
that all models considered here explain the effect exerted by contextual average, but only the 
Bayesian version of EaR, DbS and RFT fit with an effect of contextual variability. Another important 
characteristic of a contextual reward distribution which has been recently examined is the skewness. 
That the latter exerts an influence is a specific prediction of DbS and RFT which is not shared by EaR 
and DNT. To our knowledge, to date one study alone has examined reference effects dependent on 
skewness (Stewart et al., 2015; experiment 1A, 1B and 1C). In one experiment of this study (1A), 
participants were offered monetary amounts ranging from £10 to £500, but one group experienced 
more often smaller amounts than a second group (amounts included £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, 
£500 for the first group and £10, £310, £410, £460, £490, £500 for the second group), resulting in a 
positively skewed distribution for the first group and a negatively skewed distribution for the second 
group (Stewart et al., 2015). Empirically, the subjective value attributed to these amounts was 
described by a concave function for the group associated with negative skew, and by a convex 
function for the group associated with positive skew (fig. 1c; similar observations emerged from 
study 1B and 1C of Stewart et al., 2015). These findings fit nicely with predictions of DbS and RFT, 
but they are hard to explain by EaR and DNT. 
These findings raise an important question of whether effects of contextual average can always be 
explained by relative ranking as proposed by DbS. This question can be addressed by examining the 
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same experiment (Stewart et al., 2015; Experiment 1A). Relying on the notion that ranking is the 
unique factor determining context effects, DbS predicts that in the experiment of Stewart et al. 
(2015) £10 and £500 (which are the two amounts common for both contexts) will be considered as 
equally valuable across contexts. This is because in both contexts these are the worst and the best 
amounts encountered, respectively, and the number of amounts is equal across contexts. The same 
prediction arises from RFT because the two contexts have equivalent amount range and because 
£10 and £500, in addition to having equivalent relative ranking, also occupy the same position within 
the amount range. On the contrary, EaR and DNT predict a higher subjective value will be attributed 
to £10 and £500 in the positive-skew compared to negative-skew context. This is because, in that 
experiment, the positive-skew context is also characterized by lower contextual average. Although 
this question was not addressed in the paper of Stewart et al. (2015), the associated empirical data 
are freely available as supplementary material of that paper, allowing us to address this question 
here. In experiment 1A of Stewart et al. (2015), on each trial participants (positive-skew group: n = 
22; negative-skew group: n = 19; groups are obtained after discarding four participants who failed 
10% of catch trials or more; see Stewart et al., 2015) were presented with a choice between two 
option A and B, being option A associated with either amount 𝐴𝐴 with 𝑝𝐴 or with amount zero 
otherwise, and option B associated with either amount 𝐴𝐵 with 𝑝𝐵 or with amount zero otherwise 
(see Stewart et al., 2015, for details). Following an approach similar to Stewart et al. (2015), we 
examined choice data (excluding catch trials from analysis as in Stewart et al., 2015) to assess the 
subjective value attributed by participants to different amounts. Specifically, for each participant, 
each specific amount h was associated with a free parameter 𝜔ℎ estimated from choice data (hence, 
there were six free parameters overall for each participant). Considering a decision between £10 
with 𝑝𝐴 versus £500 with 𝑝𝐵 as an example, choice was described by the following logistic 
regression: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐴)
1 − 𝑃(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐴)
] = 𝑝𝐴𝜔10 − 𝑝𝐵𝜔500 
(5) 
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Note that the model fitted to data is unconstrained and does not correspond to any specific model 
such as DbS. Hence the model is suitable to assess predictions of reference effects models such as 
DbS in a qualitative way. Given our interest in comparing the subjective value for £10 and £500 
across contexts, a two-way mixed ANOVA having context as between-subject factor and amount as 
within-subject factor was run (fig. 1c). This revealed a main effect of context (F(1,35) = 6.56, p = 
0.015, 𝜂𝑃
2= 0.158), indicating that subjective value for £10 and £500 was higher in the positive-skew 
compared to the negative-skew context. A main effect of amount also emerged (F(1,35) = 82.66, p < 
0.001, 𝜂𝑃
2= 0.703) (indicating that subjective value was higher for £500 compared to £10), with no 
interaction (F(1,35) = 0.281, p = 0.599, 𝜂𝑃
2= 0.008). A larger subjective value in the positive-skew 
compared to the negative-skew context does not fit with DbS and RFT predictions. This is because 
the ranking of these two amounts and their position within the amount range do not change across 
contexts. On the contrary, EaR and DNT fit with this observation because the positive-skew context 
is also characterized by lower contextual average.  
Note that the study of Stewart et al. (2015) includes other experiments (1B and 1C in Stewart et al., 
2015) were the skewness of the distribution was manipulated. Also in these experiments the authors 
report a concave value function for the group associated with negative skew, and by a convex 
function for the group associated with positive skew. However, contrary to experiment 1A, these 
experiments are not suited for assessing any effect of average which is independent of relative 
ranking and of the relative position within the range. This is because in those experiments contexts 
had different numbers of amounts (e.g., in experiment 1B one context had six different amounts and 
the other context had seven different amounts) and hence the relative ranking and the relative 
position within the range of the best and worst amounts is not equal across contexts as in 
experiment 1A. 
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In summary, current EaR accounts fail to explain effects due to the skewness of the contextual 
distribution, and DNT has problems in accounting for effects elicited by either skewness or 
variability. Although DbS is able to explain both effects due to variability and skewness, the model 
sometimes appear to fail to account for the influence exerted by the average. The whole picture 
suggests that none of the theories considered so far is able to fully account for available empirical 
evidence. This motivated us to search for a model able to explain effects of average (beyond simple 
ranking), variability and skewness. Below we present a model which satisfies these requirements.     
 
4. A LOGISTIC MODEL OF SUBJECTIVE VALUE 
Our proposal aims primarily at explaining the full range of empirical data about reference effects in 
between-choice and non-multiattribute conditions. However, it is important to evaluate the 
proposal also outside this domain, especially in the realm of decision-making under risk, something 
which is discussed below. Our proposal builds on previous frameworks including PT, EaR, DbS and 
DNT, and aims at integrating them. Indeed, with just minimal adjustments, our model can be 
meaningfully interpreted within the frame of each previous theory. Analogies with the latter are 
highlighted below.  
The basic idea of the model is that the calculation of the subjective value 𝑉𝑅 associated with reward 
amount R depends on the following logistic function (hence the name Logistic Model of Subjective 
Value (LMSV)):  
 
𝑉𝑅 =
1
1 + 𝑒− 𝜆 
𝑅−µ
𝜎
 
 
(6) 
The model includes three parameters. As in equation 1, µ and σ are the expected reward and the 
uncertainty, respectively. If, in a given context, an agent is exposed to a sequence of reward 
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amounts, the parameter µ can be usually interpreted as the average amount and the parameter σ as 
the SD. The parameter λ (being λ > 0) is a constant (i.e., it does not change with context) which can 
be used to capture spontaneous fluctuations, or individual differences, in choice stochasticity. 
The proposal of a logistic function is primarily motivated by its simplicity, which (similar to a previous 
EaR model described in equation 1) allows one to interpret subjective value straightforwardly as a z-
scored RPE constrained to be between zero and one. A similar idea has been proposed for studying 
of perception (De Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; Vandormael et al., 2017), and also to characterize 
decision-making (Woodford (2012) has proposed an account with many analogies to the one 
developed here). In addition, it turns out that relying on a logistic function offers several advantages, 
which are highlighted below when comparing LMSV with previous theories.  
The similarities between LMSV and PT are evident. In both, a prominent role is played by the 
reference point. In PT the reference point reflects the perception of the status quo, while, following 
EaR accounts, in LMSV it corresponds to the reward expected within a given context. However, in 
analogy with DbS, LMSV treats gains and losses as two separate attributes, and in this way it is able 
to account for reference effects affecting decision-making under risk (see below). In addition, LMSV 
does not view subjective value as an unbounded quantity, but as varying between zero and one. As 
in the EaR model described in equation 1, an important feature implemented in LMSV, but absent in 
PT, is a modulation of the steepness of the function, which is realized by weighting the RPE with the 
SD. We will see that this endows LMSV with the capacity of accounting for effects dependent on the 
variability of the contextual distribution. In short, LMSV can be viewed as an extension of PT built to 
explain a wider variety of reference effects found empirically (see below). 
Clear similarities also exist between LMSV and EaR models, especially the version described in 
equation 1. Essentially, both adopt calculations similar to z-scoring, where a RPE score is divided by a 
measure of variability. A key difference is the use of a sigmodal function in LMSV, implying that the 
subjective value is bounded between zero and one. A critical consequence of this is that the function 
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mapping the reward amount to subjective value is not linear as in equation 1. We will see that such 
non-linearity enables LMSV to explain effects of skewness, and not only effects of average and 
variability as previous EaR accounts do. Altogether, LMSV extends previous EaR models by relying on 
a logistic function to explain also effects of skewness. 
We can also interpret LMSV within a DbS framework, modified with some specific assumptions. In a 
way analogous to DbS, LMSV can be conceived as relying on the notion that subjective value results 
from binary comparisons between a current reward and fictive reward samples. However, LMSV 
requires assuming that these samples are drawn from a logistic distribution described by the 
probability density function: 
 
𝑓(𝑅, µ, 𝜎) =
𝑒− 𝜆 
𝑅−µ
𝜎
𝜎 (1 + 𝑒− 𝜆 
𝑅−µ
𝜎 )
2 
 
(7) 
This derives because equation 7 corresponds to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
equation 6 (the same parameters are present in both equation 6 and 7) (Bhui & Gershman, 2018). 
Hence, processes including sampling and binary comparison, initially proposed in the context of DbS, 
are compatible as well with the computations underlying LMSV. 
Finally, LMSV has important analogies with DNT. The latter was originally proposed as a description 
of how the brain realizes efficient coding, consisting in maximizing the mutual information between 
neuronal spiking rates and the distribution of relevant environmental stimuli (Carandini & Heeger, 
2012). A similar rationale can be proposed for LMSV, provided we assume that the brain embodies 
believes that the probability of reward amounts follows the logistic distribution described by 
equation 7. This because equation 6, which calculates the subjective value according to LMSV, 
corresponds to the CDF associated with equation 7, and in general CDFs have been proved to realize 
efficient coding (Bhui & Gershman, 2018; Laughlin, 1981). In other words, spiking rates that reflect 
the subjective value as calculated by LMSV are consistent with efficient coding, under the 
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assumption of a logistic distribution. We emphasize that, to establish a link between LMSV and 
efficient coding, brain regions implicated in the computation of subjective value must represent 
logistic distributions (note that this implication is not necessary for other regions, for example those 
implicated in abstract reasoning). This prediction remains to be empirically tested, as it is not yet 
fully understood in detail how subjective value is represented in the brain. In short, although relying 
on different algorithms and therefore implying distinct predictions, DNT and LMSV both represent 
possible realizations of efficient coding in the brain. 
In sum, we have introduced a simple model of subjective value aimed at explaining a large set of 
reference effects. This model integrates features of previous accounts including PT, EaR, DbS and 
DNT. Below we explore how the model can account for empirical evidence on reference effects, and 
we also evaluate its implications for risky decision-making. In Supplementary Material, we explore 
three other interesting aspects of the new model. First, we derive some novel predictions of the 
model regarding reference effects. Second, we examine the normative principles potentially 
supported by the model, consisting in realizing optimal choice adaptation. Third, we extend the 
model to interpret between-choice-reference effects occurring in multiattribute contexts, namely 
when several attributes need to be traded-off against each other. 
 
4.1 Reference effects 
It is instructive to simulate LMSV to assess the ensuing general predictions. The model includes two 
parameters µ and σ, which reflect beliefs about the average and variability of the context, 
respectively. We assessed the impact of varying these parameters. Fig. 2a plots the subjective value 
as a function of reward amount, comparing contexts characterized by different average, captured by 
the parameter µ (the parameter σ was kept constant). The figure shows that the same reward 
amount becomes more valuable when the average contextual reward is smaller. This can potentially 
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explain empirical observations about the effect of contextual average (Rigoli et al., 2016b, 2016c). 
Fig 2b compares the value function for contexts characterized by equal average (hence the 
parameter µ was kept constant) but different variability, captured by the parameter σ. The figure 
shows that the steepness of the function decreases with variability. This can potentially explain 
empirical data indicating that, with higher compared to lower variability, distances across different 
reward amounts decrease (Rigoli et al., 2016a). 
A critical question is whether LMSV predicts any effect of contextual skewness (Stewart et al., 2015). 
We can address this question by simulating experiment 1A of Stewart et al. (2015) adopting LMSV. 
Remember this experiment compared a positive-skew contextual distribution, including the amounts 
£10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500, against a negative-skew distribution including £10, £310, £410, 
£460, £490, and £500. To model this scenario, we estimated the value function according to LMSV, 
assuming that the expected reward µ was equal to the contextual average (i.e., µ = 147 and µ = 363, 
respectively) and the uncertainty was equal to the contextual SD (SD is equal across contexts; hence 
σ = 187 for both). Focusing specifically on the £10-£500 range common across contexts, LMSV 
predicts a concave function for the positive-skew context, and a convex function for the negative-
skew context (fig. 2c). Note also that, according to LMSV, the subjective value attributed to £10 and 
£500 (which are the two amounts common across contexts) is predicted to be higher in the positive-
skew compared to the negative-skew context (fig. 2c). This is consistent with the novel analysis of 
empirical data reported above. These simulations show that LMSV predicts contextual effects of 
skewness. Ultimately, these effects are predicted as a consequence of changes in the contextual 
average. In experiments investigating the influence of skewness (Stewart e al., 2015), when the 
contextual skewness changes, also the contextual average changes (positive and negative skew 
implicate lower and higher average, respectively). This has important implications when LMSV is 
adopted. The sigmoid function postulated by LMSV is non-linear and presents one region which is 
convex (when the subjective value is close to zero) and one region which is concave (when the 
subjective value is close to one). When the average of the contextual distribution varies, the convex 
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and concave regions will move. Therefore, a specific range of reward amounts may initially map to 
the concave region of the function. But, when the contextual average changes (specifically, when it 
increases), the same amount range may now map to the concave region of the function. In other 
words, in some conditions LMSV predicts that when the contextual distribution has lower average 
(and positive skew) one amount range may appear as being associated with a concave function; 
when the contextual distribution has higher average (and negative skew) the same amount range 
may appear as being associated with a convex function.  
In addition to considering simulations, it is important to examine in detail how well LMSV fits with 
empirical data on between-choice and non-multiattribute reference effects. To this aim, we consider 
all such effects we are aware of as they have been described in the literature. These include an 
effect of the average of the contextual reward distribution (Rigoli et al., 2016b, 2016c), an effect of 
variability (Rigoli et al., 2016a), and one of skewness (Stewart et al., 2015). Fig. 3 shows empirical 
evidence on between-choice and non-multiattribute reference effects in conjunction with 
predictions derived from LMSV regarding this evidence. Here, LMSV is implemented by assuming 
that, for any context condition, µ and σ correspond to the actual average and SD, respectively, 
characterising that context in the experiment. A comprehensive list of between-choice and non-
multiattribute reference effects is also provided in tab. 1. Also, for the other theories of choice 
discussed above, tab. 1 indicates whether their predictions fit with each specific reference effect. 
From fig. 3 and tab. 1, we can see that LMSV is able to replicate all empirical observations 
considered. Specifically, it is consistent with studies on the effect of contextual average (fig. 3a; 
Rigoli et al., 2016b, 2016c), contextual variability (fig. 3b; Rigoli et al., 2016a), and contextual 
skewness (fig. 3c; Stewart et al., 2015). When considering experiment 1A of Stewart et al. (2015), 
LMSV predicts higher subjective value for £10 and £500 in the positive-skew compared to negative-
skew context (fig. 3c).  
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In summary, we argue that our discussion and simulations indicate that LMSV offers a 
comprehensive explanation of known reference effects in between-choice and non-multiattribute 
scenarios (see SI for novel predictions arising from LMSV regarding reference effects). In fact, this 
model predicts effects of skewness which are not contemplated by EaR and DNT, and it explains 
effects of average in scenarios where these effects emerge empirically but are not predicted by DbS 
nor by RFT. To date, in between-choice and non-multiattribute domains, we are not aware of any 
form of reference effect found empirically which does not fit with LMSV. In Supplementary Material, 
we have identified novel and specific predictions of LMSV about reference effects which remain to 
be examined by future research. 
 
------------------------------------ 
TAB 1, FIG 2, and FIG 3 around here 
------------------------------------- 
4.2 Decision-making under risk 
For a theory of subjective value, a fundamental question regards its ability to reproduce empirical 
data about risk-sensitive decision-making. Here, we ask this question for LMSV, with the aim of 
offering a broad overview of this new theory. We do not discuss EaR and DNT in this context, though 
we consider DbS because the latter has offered a new compelling perspective on risky-decision 
making which also inspires LMSV (Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 
2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011).  
Contemporary literature often relies on PT for interpreting decision-making under risk (Camerer et 
al., 2011; Kahneman, D., & Tversky, 1979). The specific value function proposed by this theory is 
concave for gains and convex for losses, hence predicting risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for 
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losses. In addition, the value function is steeper for losses, generating loss aversion, expressed for 
example in a preference for a null outcome over a 50/50 gamble returning either a monetary 
amount gained or the same amount lost. A concave function for gains, a convex function for losses, 
and loss aversion have been reported by several empirical investigations (Camerer et al., 2011; 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, 1979).  
Although PT has been remarkably successful in explaining empirical data on decision-making under 
risk (Camerer et al., 2011), recent studies, originally aimed at testing predictions of DbS, have 
emphasized a new compelling perspective, where reference effects play a central role (Stewart, 
2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011). This 
perspective relies on treating gains and losses as two separate attributes, meaning that decisions 
requiring a trade-off between gains and losses are considered in the realm of multiattribute choice. 
It follows that, for options characterized by both a potential gain and loss, the former is evaluated 
with respect to the contextual distribution of gains and irrespective of losses, and the latter with 
respect to the distribution of losses irrespective of gains. Eventually, the total option value is 
obtained by summing the subjective value of the gain and the value of the loss.  
An analogous approach can be proposed for LMSV. We used simulations to assess the implications 
of this approach when applied to LMSV. First, we tested predictions for gain and loss contexts 
separately. While risk aversion and risk seeking have been usually observed empirically for gains and 
losses, respectively (Camerer et al., 2011; Kahneman, D., & Tversky, 1979), recent evidence raises 
the possibility that these findings are the product of reference effects (Stewart et al., 2015). This 
evidence corresponds to the study examined above when discussing reference effects dependent on 
skewness (Stewart et al., 2015), opposing a positive-skew contextual distribution including amounts 
£10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500 to a negative-skew distribution including £10, £310, £410, £460, 
£490, and £500. As seen above, a concave function describes subjective value in the positive-skew 
condition (fig. 1c). This implies risk aversion, as for example a sure gain will be favoured over a 50/50 
24 
 
gamble returning either a double gain or no gain. On the contrary, a convex function characterises 
subjective value in the positive-skew condition (fig. 1c). This implies risk seeking, as for example a 
sure gain will be avoided in favour of a 50/50 gamble returning either a double gain or no gain. In 
other words, the study of Stewart et al. (2015) implicates that risk sensitivity in the gain domain 
depends on the context. We have already seen that this scenario is captured by LMSV (fig 2c, fig 3c), 
which predicts a concave and convex function in the negative-skew and positive-skew condition, 
respectively. Hence this captures context-dependent changes in risk sensitivity as emerged 
empirically (Stewart et al., 2015).  
Whether context affects risk sensitivity in the loss domain remains to be explored empirically. In this 
domain, LMSV offers a similar interpretation which we describe using simulations (fig. 5a). We 
simulate a scenario considering a negative-skew contextual distribution including losses -£10, -£20, -
£50, -£100, -£200, and -£500, and a positive-skew distribution including -£10, -£310, -£410, -£460, -
£490, and -£500. A convex function is obtained by LMSV in the negative-skew condition which 
implies risk seeking, as for example a sure loss is avoided in favour of a 50/50 gamble returning 
either a double loss or no loss (fig. 4a). A concave function is obtained in the positive-skew condition 
which implies risk aversion, as for example a sure loss is favoured over a 50/50 gamble returning 
either a double loss or no loss (fig. 4a). In short, inspired by a perspective pioneered by DbS, LMSV 
views risk sensitivity for both gains and losses as the product of reference effects. Therefore, the 
commonly observed risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses are interpreted not as intrinsic 
phenomena, but as emergent from the fact that, in most ecological contexts, smaller gains and 
losses are more frequent than larger gains and losses. 
Next, we evaluated LMSV in contexts where information about gains and losses need to be 
integrated. A recent study has shown that reference effects are critical also in this domain (Walasek 
& Stewart, 2015). This study involved repeated choices between a null outcome and a 50/50 gamble 
returning either a gain of amount x or a loss of equivalent amount -x. Crucially, the range of the 
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contextual distribution of gains and losses varied across conditions. Four conditions were compared: 
one involving a [£0 £20] range for both gains and losses, one having a [£0 £40] range for both gains 
and losses, a third having a [£0 £40] range for gains and a [£0 £20] range for losses, and finally one 
characterized by a [£0 £20] range for gains and a [£0 £40] range for losses. Evidence indicated that, 
when an equal range characterizes gains and losses, the gamble and the sure option were equally 
preferred, implying an equal weight for gains and losses (fig. 4b). Loss aversion, expressed as an 
avoidance of the gamble, emerged when the loss range was smaller than the gain range (fig. 4b). The 
opposite of loss aversion, expressed is favouring the gamble over the sure option, was evident when 
the loss range was larger than the gain range (fig. 4b). 
We simulated this scenario using LMSV, estimating (for each option) the subjective value of the gain 
and of the loss using their respective contextual average and SD. The total value of the safe option 
was estimated as the subjective value associated with no gain plus the value associated with no loss. 
This was subtracted from the total subjective value of the gamble, calculated as the subjective value 
of the gain x plus the value of the loss -x divided by two (to account for the 50/50 chance). 
Simulations replicate the empirical findings described above (fig. 4b). Interestingly, simulations also 
highlight a novel prediction that, when losses and gains have different range, there will be a specific 
monetary amount x (located between the average of losses and the average of gains) for which the 
value difference between the gamble and the sure option will be maximal (fig. 4c). In short, for 
LMSV, differences in the relative weight attributed to losses compared to gains are not intrinsic, but 
they are the product of reference effects. An implication is that the usual observation of loss 
aversion is interpreted as the consequence of a smaller variability of losses compared to gains 
characterizing many ecological contexts (Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006). 
Altogether, the approach to risk sensitivity adopted by LMSV follows the approach proposed 
originally by DbS (which is extensively discussed elsewhere; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 
2015; Walasek & Stewart, 2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011). The key idea consists in treating 
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losses and gains as distinct attributes, and in viewing risk sensitivity not as intrinsic but as the 
consequence of reference effects. Although DbS and LMSV share this common perspective, 
nonetheless it is possible to identify specific predictions distinguishing the two models. For instance, 
consider the task described above involving choices between a null outcome and a 50/50 gamble 
returning either a gain x or loss -x. Keeping the context for gains constant, compare a low-variability 
context where the distribution of losses includes -£5, -£9, -£11, and -£15 against a high-variability 
context where the distribution of losses is -£5, -£6, -£14, and -£15. Given the influence of the SD 
postulated by LMSV, this model predicts that, in the low- compared to high-variability context, the -
£5 loss will be perceived as relatively better, and the -£15 as relatively worse. No such prediction 
derives from DbS. Analogous scenarios remain to be examined empirically. 
------------------------------------ 
FIG 4 around here 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we offer a general overview of research about reference effects occurring during 
decision-making in between-choice and non-multiattribute contexts. Although these effects were 
implicitly acknowledged already by EUT (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), their explicit and 
systematic treatment can be found for the first time in PT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). More 
recently, theoretical and empirical research on these effects has flourished. Although contemporary 
models already provide a compelling description of the underlying processes, we note that none 
accounts fully for empirical data. Motivated by shortcomings of previous accounts, we propose 
LMSV as a model able to explain a broader set of empirical data.  
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LMSV can be usefully interpreted within the perspective offered by each previous theory. Its core 
principles are inspired by PT and EaR (Hunter & Gershman, 2018; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2017), and consist in conceiving subjective value 
essentially as a “squashed” z-score. Different from PT and EaR, reliance on a logistic function enables 
LMSV to implement efficient coding in a similar way as DNT (Louie et al., 2013; 2014; 2015; Rangel & 
Clithero, 2012), and potentially to fit with memory sampling processes analogous to those proposed 
by DbS (Brown & Matthews, 2011; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006; 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 
2015; Vlaev, 2018; Vlaev et al., 2011). Thanks to these substantial connections with previous 
theories, LMSV represents a unifying framework integrating fundamental insights proposed 
originally by other accounts.   
LMSV can be interpreted as belonging to a broad family of models which rely on a sigmoid function 
to explain context effects (Cheadle et al., 2014; Juechems et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). Similar to 
LMSV, Cheadle at al. (2014) have proposed that perceptive judgements are based on transforming a 
stimulus through a sigmoid function postulated to change based on past experience. However, in 
Cheadle et al. (2014) past experience does not change the steepness of the sigmoid function. This is 
a critical difference from LMSV, where the steepness of the function varies reflecting the variability 
of the context. This characteristic of LMSV, absent in Cheadle et al. (2014), is critical here because it 
allows LMSV to explain context effects based on contextual variability. The model of Cheadle et al. 
(2014) has also been extended to explain phenomena in value-based decision-making such as 
within-choice context effects (Li et al., 2018) and how an overall propensity to gamble changes 
based on past reward experience (Juechems et al., 2017). Similar to LMSV, these proposals also rely 
on a sigmoid function to explain context effects. However, like Cheadle et al. (2014) but contrary to 
LMSV, they do not allow the steepness of the function to vary (hence they would fail to explain 
between-choice context effects dependent on variability). 
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It is important to emphasize that the level of analysis of LMSV is relatively abstract. This implies that 
LMSV is agnostic on the fine-grained psychological processes underlying computation of subjective 
value, though it provides constraints for theories speaking to such level of analysis. A possibility on 
the nature of fine-grained processes is inspired by DbS, and consists in memory sampling and binary 
comparisons. As discussed above, LMSV is consistent with this type of process, but does not 
necessarily imply it. A compelling alternative is that the brain directly entertains beliefs about the 
summary statistics of a contextual reward distribution (e.g., Friston, 2005), in the form of expected 
reward and uncertainty, and uses these during calculation of subjective value. Hybrid processes are 
also in line with LMSV, in which summary statistics are integrated with individual memory samples. 
With this regard, we note that value-based decision-making is a phylogenetically ancient function 
already present in simple organisms such as insects (Strausfel & Hirth, 2013). These animals’ 
behaviour is driven by basic sensory-motor processes, and lacks higher-order memory capabilities. 
Therefore, at least for some animals, it is possible that subjective value computation, and associated 
reference effects observed empirically (Marsh & Kacelnik, 2002), relies primarily on basic summary 
statistics rather than complex memory sampling. This raises the possibility of a role for summary 
statistics, alone or together with memory sampling, also in humans.  
From a comparison between LMSV and DbS, another important question arises: how does the brain 
represent distributions of variables? According to DbS, the brain represents the precise distribution 
of values characterising a context; this distribution can have any shape. On the contrary, according 
to LMSV, the brain assumes that the distribution of values characterising a context is logistic. This 
implies that in DbS the brain represents the real-world distribution faithfully, while in LMSV the brain 
transforms any distribution to a logistic distribution. This raises two questions. First, how can we test 
empirically whether the distribution is reflected faithfully (as in DbS) or whether it is approximated 
with a symmetrical bell-shaped function (such as a logistic function; as in LSMV)? Second, why would 
it be reasonable for the brain to approximate any distribution with a symmetrical bell-shaped 
function such as a logistic function? The answer to the first question, we argue, requires to tease 
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apart different predictions of models such as DbS and LMSV and to assess their fit with empirical 
data (something partially done here in the context of between-choice non-multiattribute reference 
effects). For the second question, we propose the following answer. First, in the real-world variables 
may be sometimes negatively skewed, sometimes positively skewed, and other times characterised 
by zero skewness; implying that on average the level of skewness may be around zero. Therefore, 
given a limited computational capacity, the brain may simply assume a level of skewness equal to 
the average, namely zero (as in a logistic distribution). Second, neurophysiological evidence supports 
influential theories such as predictive coding where the brain represents variables adopting a 
symmetrical (in that case Gaussian) distribution (e.g., Friston, 2005). For all these considerations, it 
may be reasonable for the brain to approximate any distribution in the real world by assuming a 
priori that any distribution is a symmetrical bell-shaped function (such as in LMSV). Although we 
emphasise the plausibility of this reasoning, we also stress that a promising avenue for future 
research is to explore different functions and to assess their merits and shortcomings with respect to 
empirical data. With this regard, there is evidence that, in the real world, both gains and losses are 
distributed according to a power law function (Stewart et al., 2006), hinting to the possibility that 
the latter may also be a good candidate for explaining reference effects. 
Most models (including DbS, DNT, RFT, and LMSV) assume that subjective value is a bounded 
quantity. This can potentially produce ceiling effects that are problematic. Consider an example 
where, during previous trials, an agent has been offered options comprising £1, £2, £3 as amounts. 
Next, at the current trial, an agent is offered an option returning £10000 with 1/100 chance versus 
an option returning £20000 with 1/100 chance. Because £10000 and £20000 both rank better, and 
are way higher, than all previous amounts, according to most theories they will both receive the 
highest subjective value (for DbS, LMSV or RFT, a subjective value equal to one). This predicts 
indifference for the two options, a prediction which is potentially problematic because real agents 
are likely to always choose the £20000 option. One potential way to address this is to assume that 
amounts present in the current trial also exert reference effects (these are forms of within-choice 
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effect). If this is assumed, then £20000 would be evaluated with respect to £1, £2, £3, and £10000; 
while £10000 would be evaluated with respect to £1, £2, £3, and £20000. A preference for the 
£20000 option would now be predicted. 
An important question is how reference effects arise out of neural mechanisms. Research has 
identified a specific brain network engaged during computation of subjective value and choice. 
Within this network, a central role is played by the dopaminergic midbrain (e.g., Glimcher, 2011; 
Schultz et al., 1997). A large body of evidence has revealed that neural activity in the dopaminergic 
midbrain is proportional to the subjective value (Schultz et al., 1997). In addition, studies 
manipulating the contextual reward distribution have found that this neural response is inversely 
correlated with the expected reward (Schultz et al., 1997). These findings have been interpreted as 
evidence of an expression of a RPE signal in this region (Glimcher, 2011; Schultz et al., 1997). 
Moreover, research has manipulated the range of the reward distribution, observing that two 
different reward magnitudes elicit a more distinct neural response when the range is smaller 
(Diederen et al., 2016; Tobler et al., 2005). Altogether, these data fit with the notion that a RPE 
weighted by uncertainty is signalled in the dopaminergic midbrain. Notably, this is analogous to the 
calculations proposed by LMSV, establishing a connection between this theory and neural processes. 
A critical empirical question is whether a link exists between neural and behavioural reference 
effects. Addressing this question, recent studies have shown that reference effects emerge together 
in dopaminergic midbrain and in choice behaviour (Rigoli et al., 2016b; 2016c; 2018). These findings 
provide compelling evidence in line with the possibility that behavioural reference effects are 
supported by neural adaptation processes occurring in the dopaminergic midbrain. Interestingly, a 
recent study has highlighted also a role for the hippocampus, as engagement of this region favours 
the emergence of reference effects (Rigoli et al., 2016c). The hippocampus is critical for processing 
contextual information in several domains (Holland & Bouton, 1999), and this research has extended 
this role to decision-making. Interestingly, this region is implicated also in memory processing 
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(Squire, 1992), raising the possibility that it may guide memory sampling underlying reference 
effects in value computation.  
An important distinction in decision-making under risk is between decision from description and 
decision from experience (e.g., Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). In the former, participants are explicitly 
informed about the values at stake, while in the latter they have to learn these values from 
experience. Most empirical studies of between-choice non-multiattribute reference effects have 
focused on decision from description (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2018; Stewart et al., 2015; 
Walasek & Stewart, 2015). However, we note also studies about decision from experience which 
have manipulated the contextual average (Hunter & Gershman, 2018; Rigoli et al., 2018). Results of 
these studies are analogous to those emerged during decision from description. However a 
systematic exploration of reference effects during decision from experience requires further 
research. 
We have emphasized that the specific scope of this manuscript is research on value-based decision-
making focusing on between-choice and non-multiattribute contexts. However, it is useful to briefly 
discuss the more general implications of our arguments, as reference effects are important also 
outside decision-making, and, within the latter, also outside the between-choice and non-
multiattribute case. With respect to phenomena going beyond decision-making, evidence from some 
psychophysics contexts support models analogous to DNT, where the average stimulation, 
independent of the variability, regulates the discriminability of two stimuli (Carandini & Heeger, 
2012). For example, if auditory stimuli are on average louder, sounds are usually harder to 
discriminate, even if their variability is constant (Jerger, 1957). This suggests that models similar to 
LMSV may be inappropriate to describe some perceptual phenomena, as in LMSV discriminability 
depends on the variability, and not on the average, of the distribution. However, recent studies 
about perceptive decision-making have shown that models analogous to LMSV sometimes offer a 
compelling explanation of reference effects (Cheadle et al., 2014; De Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; 
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Vandormael et al., 2017). Further research is needed to establish, outside value-based decision-
making, in which conditions processes analogous to those proposed by LMSV are at play. 
Research has also examined reference effects affecting subjective judgement. For example, a study 
has explored how knowledge of other people’s income affects satisfaction about the own income 
(Brown et al., 2008). This study found that the relative ranking of the own income (a concept 
analogous to DbS) affects satisfaction ratings. However, ranking effects provided an insufficient 
explanation, because the actual distance from other incomes was also critical. One way to interpret 
these and similar findings is to rely on RFT (Parducci, 1965; 1995), which combines ranking and range 
processes. Alternatively, an adaptation of DbS grounded on sophisticated memory retrieval can also 
explain these and similar observations (Brown & Matthews, 2011). By relying on a parametric 
framework which, as we have seen here, is capable of explaining some forms of skewness effects, 
LMSV may emerge as capable to capture both ranking and range influences observed in judgement 
(and possibly make also specific predictions as in the case of decision-making). This remains an open 
question for future research.     
Within decision-making, the most studied reference effects are those characterizing within-choice 
and multiattribute contexts, and sophisticated theories have been proposed in this domain (Huber 
at al., 1982; Noguchi & Stewart, 2018; Rigoli et al., 2017; Roe et al., 2001; Ronayne & Brown, 2017; 
Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Soltani et al., 2012; Trueblood et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2010; Tversky, 
1972). Similar to PT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and early EaR models (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006), 
many theories assume that, for each relevant attribute, a stimulus is evaluated relative to a 
reference point corresponding to the average value of the options available (Roe et al., 2001; Soltani 
et al., 2012; Trueblood et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2010; Tversky, 1972). Other theories are based on 
an extension of DbS (Noguchi & Stewart, 2018; Ronayne & Brown, 2017). Finally, one theory 
proposes an extension of the EaR model described in equation 1, emphasizing the influence of 
variability, in addition to the average, of the options available (Rigoli et al., 2017). Further theoretical 
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analyses are needed to assess whether the concepts proposed here in relation with LMSV may 
contribute to improve our understanding of within-choice and multiattribute contexts. Finally, two 
additional categories of effects exist, between-choice and multiattribute effects on the one hand, 
within-choice and non-multiattribute effects on the other. While the latter remain to be explored 
under the framework offered by LMSV, in Supplementary Material we extend LMSV to the former, 
implying that this theory can be regarded as a general model of between-choice reference effects in 
decision-making.  
In short, we have summarised and critically evaluated research on reference effects during decision-
making, focusing on between-choice contexts. Although we emphasize several strengths of previous 
perspectives on this topic, we have noted shortcomings of each of these perspectives. Integrating 
important insights originally proposed by previous theories, we offer an alternative model which 
explains a broader set of data. A question for future research is how general the framework is, both 
within and outside decision-making. 
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Source Context manipulation Effect EaR Bayesian EaR DbS DNT RFT LMSV 
Rigoli et al 
(2016c) (see 
also Rigoli et al 
2016b) 
A: £1   £3   £5 
B: £3   £5  £7 
£3A > £3B 
£5A > £5B 
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Rigoli et al 
(2016a) 
A: £2  £3  £4  £5 
B: £3   £4 
£3A > £3B 
£4A < £4B 
↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ 
Stewart et al 
Exp A (see also 
B and C) 
(2015) 
A: £10 £20 £50 £100 £200 £500 
B: £10 £310 £410 £460 £490 £500 
A: concave 
B: convex 
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ 
Stewart et al 
Exp A(2015) 
A: £10 £20 £50 £100 £200 £500 
B: £10 £310 £410 £460 £490 £500 
£10A > £10B 
£500A > £500B 
↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ 
Tab. 1. Summary of reference effects that have been observed empirically in between-choice and 
non-multiattribute scenarios. Column one indicates where the empirical effects have been described 
in detail. Column two describes the manipulation adopted, reporting the monetary amount 
characterizing context A and context B. Column three describes the effect found empirically. 
Columns four-to-nine indicate, for each effect, whether it is consistent (↑) or not (↓) with 
predictions of each theory. Note that EaR refers to the model proposed by Kőszegi & Rabin (2006), 
Bayesian EaR refers to the model described in equation 1. 
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Fig 1. Empirical data on reference effects occurring in between-choice and non-multiattribute 
contexts. The vertical axis reports the subjective value estimated from choice behaviour (error bars 
represent standard errors). A: Data from Rigoli et al., (2016c) where a low-average context was 
characterised by £1, £3 and £5 and a high-average context was characterised by £3, £5 and £7. The 
figure is adapted from fig 1d of Rigoli et al. (2016c), pooling all participants together. B: Data from 
Rigoli et al., (2016a) where a high-variability context was characterised by £2, £3, £4 and £5 and a 
low-variability context was characterised by £3 and £4. The figure is adapted from fig 4a-b of Rigoli 
et al. (2016a), pooling all participants together. C: Data from Stewart et al. (2015; experiment 1A) 
where a positive-skew context was characterised by £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500 and a 
negative-skew context was characterised by £10, £310, £410, £460, £490, and £500. The figure is 
adapted from fig. 4A of Stewart et al. (2015), rescaled based on the analysis about £10 ad £500 run 
here (see main text). 
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Fig. 2. Predictions of LMSV about reference effects in between-choice and non-multiattribute 
contexts. Different lines represent data simulated with different parameters. A: Predicted effect of 
average (σ = 2; λ = 1). B: Predicted effect of variability (µ = 4.5; λ = 1). C: Predicted effect of skewness 
(σ = 187; λ = 3). 
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Fig 3. The same empirical data shown in fig. 1 are displayed together with predictions arising from 
LMSV. For each specific context condition, LMSV was fitted using parameters µ and σ which 
correspond to the average and SD, respectively, characterising that context condition. 
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Fig. 4. Predictions of LMSV relative to reference effects occurring during decision-making under risk. 
Different lines represent data simulated with different parameters. A: Predicted reference effects 
regarding the value function of losses (σ = 187; λ = 3). B:  Gray dots describe empirical data (with 
95% confidence interval) about reference effects occurring during choices between a null outcome 
and a 50/50 gamble between a monetary amount gained and the same amount lost (Walasek & 
Stewart (2015)), adapted from tab. 1 relative to experiment 1a in that paper). The range of the 
contextual distribution is varied for gains and losses. For instance, G40 & L20 indicates that the 
range for gains is 40 and the range for losses is 20. The loss aversion parameter describes the ratio 
among the weight given to losses over gains in a logistic regression mode of choice (See Walasek & 
Stewart 2015 for details). Dark dots represent predictions of LMSV in this task. When the range is 40, 
µ = ±20 and σ = 11.98; when the range is 20, µ = ±10 and σ = 6.2. We adopted a parameter λ = 3 for 
all conditions. C: Predictions of LMSV in the same scenario regarding the value difference between 
options as function of monetary amount. 
